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Popper famously held that the growth of scientiªc knowledge and the Dar-
winian mechanism of trial and error elimination are analogous processes.
Both the validity of this analogy and Popper’s interpretation of what this
Darwinian mechanism consists in have been criticized. But it has been ig-
nored that the use of Popper’s Darwinian analogy had changed in the course
of Popper’s life. I will argue that until the 1960s, he used the Darwinian
process as a model for understanding the growth of scientiªc knowledge,
whereas from the 1960s on, the explanatory order was reversed: he used his
new insights about the growth of scientiªc knowledge to say something about
the real nature of Darwinian selection. In short, this analogy was so central
for Popper’s thinking that rather than giving up on it, he tried very hard to
ªnd theories of biological evolution that would make this analogy plausible.
And this is what led him to make somewhat surprising claims about the na-
ture of selection as well as to ºirt with Lamarckism.
I. Introduction
One of the most deeply entrenched ideas in Popper’s philosophy is the
analogy between the growth of scientiªc knowledge and the Darwinian
mechanism of natural selection. Popper gave his ªrst exposition of these
ideas very early on. In a letter to Donald Campbell,1 Popper says that the
idea goes back at least to the early thirties.2 And he had a fairly detailed
1. Letters from Popper to Donald Campbell, 1964, February 3 and April 6, Popper ar-
chive, ªle number 282/12.
2. He is probably referring to the unpublished manuscript “Die Beiden Grundprob-
leme der Erkenntnistheorie,” which he completed in 1932 (see Keuth 2005, pp. 2–3 on
the fate of this unpublished book). It has been argued that Popper’s general idea of describ-
ing the acquisition of knowledge in terms of a selection process (rather than in terms of in-
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account of it in his “What is dialectic?”, a talk given in 1937 and pub-
lished in 1940:3
If we want to explain why human thought tends to try out every
conceivable solution for any problem with which it is faced, then
we can appeal to a highly general sort of regularity. The method by
which a solution is approached is usually the same; it is the method
of trial and error. Thus, fundamentally, is also the method used by
living organisms in the process of adaptation. (Popper [1940]
1963, p. 312)
And here is the famous exposition of the general idea of the analogy be-
tween theory choice and natural selection in the Logic of Scientiªc Discovery:
How and why do we accept one theory in preference to others?
[. . .] We choose the theory which best holds its own in competi-
tion with other theories; the one which, by natural selection, proves
itself the ªttest to survive. This will be the one which not only has
hitherto stood up to the severest tests, but the one which is also
testable in the most rigorous way. (Popper [1959] 2002, p. 91)
And he gave a detailed account of this analogy in his last book (Popper
1994). So it seems that the analogy between the growth of scientiªc
knowledge and the Darwinian mechanisms of natural selection were cen-
tral to his philosophy throughout his life.
In fact, I will argue that this analogy was so central that rather than
giving up on it, Popper tried very hard to ªnd theories of biological evolu-
tion that would make this analogy plausible. And this is what explains his
often dismissed and misinterpreted ºirtation with Lamarckism.
I will argue that until the 1960s, Popper used the Darwinian process as
a model for understanding the growth of scientiªc knowledge. He took
the Darwinian model for granted and applied it in the case of the growth
of scientiªc knowledge. From the 1960s, the explanatory order was re-
versed. He no longer took the Darwinian model for granted, but rather
used his new insights about the growth of scientiªc knowledge to ªgure
out the real nature of Darwinian selection. And this led him to make some
dubious and widely criticized claims about the biological domain (includ-
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struction) goes even further back to debates over the right method to be used in the Aus-
trian school system between 1925 and 1927. See Bartley 1974.
3. The paper was published in Mind in 1940 and reprinted as chapter 15 of Conjectures
and Refutations. The most explicit statement of the evolutionary analogy is on pp. 312–
313.
ing a rarely publicized unsuccessful attempt to publish in defense of La-
marckism in Nature).
The plan of this paper is the following. First, I outline the main simi-
larities, as Popper perceived them, between the growth of scientiªc
knowledge and the Darwinian mechanism for natural selection (Section II)
and point out how Popper’s picture of one side of this analogy, the growth
of scientiªc knowledge, got more complex during the 1960s, arguably, as
a result of his interaction with Lakatos and Zahar (Section III). I aim to
point out how, in order to preserve the Darwinian analogy in the light of
his new way of thinking about the growth of scientiªc knowledge, he had
to reinterpret what he took to be the Darwinian model of natural selection
(Section IV and V). Finally, I brieºy examine whether and how the Dar-
winian analogy that Popper held to be so important could be salvaged in a
biologically plausible manner (Section VI).
II. The Darwinian Analogy
There is no shortage of passages in Popper’s writings that emphasize the
similarities between the growth of scientiªc knowledge and the Darwin-
ian mechanism for natural selection. The question is what these passages
say about the nature of this similarity. The main point of analogy seems
to be that both the growth of scientiªc knowledge and the Darwinian
mechanisms are selection processes (to be contrasted with instruction):
they consist of “random” (more on this soon) trials followed by error-
elimination.
Here is how it works in the biological case. Selection is often4 described
as repeated cycles of two separate processes. As Ernst Mayr says, “natural
selection is actually a two-step process, the ªrst one consisting of the pro-
duction of genetically different individuals (variation), while the survival
and reproductive success of these individuals is determined in the second
step, the actual selection process (Mayr 1991, p. 68; see also Mayr 1978;
1982, pp. 519–520; 2001, p. 117).5 David Hull calls these two steps rep-
lication and interaction (Hull 1981; 1988; Hull et al. 2001).6 He deªnes
selection as:
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4. But not always. Another inºuential way of describing selection is in terms of the
heritable variation of ªtness, see Godfrey-Smith 2007, Sober 1984, Okasha 2007,
Lewontin 1970, Maynard Smith 1987 and Nanay forthcoming for a comparison of these
two ways of thinking about selection.
5. Popper and Mayr had an extensive correspondence throughout most of their (long)
careers. See Popper archive, ªle number 325/1.
6. As a Ph.D. student, Hull took Popper’s class at Indiana University in 1963 and Pop-
per was so impressed with him that he wrote a (very positive) letter of recommendation for
him on June 2, 1964. Popper’s letter of recommendation for Hull is in the Popper archive,
ªle number 386/44.
The repeated cycles of replication and environmental interaction so
structured that environmental interaction causes replication to be
differential. (Hull et al. 2001, p. 53)
Popper’s claim is that this model also applies to the growth of scientiªc
knowledge. Scientists form bald conjectures: this is the ªrst step of repli-
cation (Hull) or variation (Mayr). And then they subject these conjectures
to falsiªcation: this is the second step of environmental interaction (Hull)
or “actual selection” (Mayr).
Thus, as the selection process consists of two steps, the analogy between
selection among scientiªc theories and natural selection could be broken
down into two different aspects: (i) the analogy between the formation of
conjectures and replication, and (ii) the analogy between falsiªcation and
environmental interaction. I will put (ii) aside, although it has been fa-
mously argued that this analogy is at best misleading: theories do not get
falsiªed in the way organisms die; the death of theories is a slow death (see
Lakatos 1970 for the most famous exposition of this idea). Note however
that the Darwinian analogy does not imply that the second step of envi-
ronmental interaction brings either death or survival. There can be selec-
tion even if the second step of environmental interaction only inºuences
the number of offspring the competing organisms have (see, for example,
Williams 1966). But the main focus of Popper’s Darwinian analogy is not
(ii), but (i).
Popper’s original insight was that just as the ªrst step of natural selec-
tion (replication, variation) is random, the conjectures of science are also
random. And just as any kind of evolutionary change is only achieved with
the contribution of the second step of selection (environmental interac-
tion), the same is true for the growth of scientiªc knowledge, which could
not happen without the second step of error-elimination.
And here we need to make a distinction between the early (pre-1960s)
Popper and the late Popper. To state the difference very simply, the early
Popper takes it for granted that mutation is random and concludes from
the Darwinian analogy that conjectures are also random (see esp. Popper
1959, p. 31). The late Popper, in contrast, no longer takes conjectures to
be (fully) random and looks for ways in which mutations could be inter-
preted as not (completely) random.
III. Popper’s Revisions of the Darwinian Analogy
The original version of Popper’s Darwinian analogy took the model of ran-
dom variation from biology and applied it to the formation of conjectures.
If this process is random, then there can be no logical analysis thereof. As
Popper emphasizes in the Logic of Scientiªc Discovery:
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The act of conceiving a theory seems to me neither to call for logi-
cal analysis nor to be susceptible of it. The question how a new idea
occurs to a man—whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic con-
ºict, or a scientiªc theory—[. . .] is irrelevant to the logical analysis
of scientiªc knowledge. (1959, p. 31)
Even in his ªrst thorough and detailed exposition of the Darwinian anal-
ogy, “Evolution and the tree of knowledge,” which was originally deliv-
ered as the Herbert Spencer lecture in Oxford in 1961 and mostly un-
changed before its publication as Chapter Seven in Objective Knowledge in
1972, he repeatedly talks about “purely accidental co-operation of inde-
pendent mutations” (Popper [1961] 1972, p. 273), “purely accidental
mutation,” “independent accidental mutations” (p. 270) and applies this
model to the formation of scientiªc conjectures.
The problem is that random formation of conjectures just does not
seem to be the way science proceeds and some important philosophers in
Popper’s circle in the 1960s were giving convincing arguments and thor-
ough analyses of actual case studies that demonstrated this. The most im-
portant of these was Imre Lakatos.
Lakatos is very explicit that scientiªc research s are not sets of theories
but “a temporal chain of sets of theories.”7 If a scientiªc research pro-
gramme faces an objection, it lives on (maybe acquiring a bit of a protec-
tive belt). In other words, scientiªc research programmes can and do
change. The set of theories in a scientiªc research programme at time t is
different from the set of theories in it at some later time, t*. And what set
of theories we get in a research programme at time t* depends on what
happens to the research programme at time t—what objections it faces
and how it can handle them.
Thus, Lakatos’s scientiªc research programmes can be gradually ªne-
tuned: the set of theories that comprise the research programme at time t*
can deal with more objections than the set of theories at time t, which pre-
cedes t*. The “mutations” of the research programme are not completely
“blind” in the sense Popper thinks genetic mutations are blind: it is not
the case that “the survival of a mutation cannot inºuence the further mu-
tations” (Popper [1975] 1996, p. 5). In the case of a scientiªc research
programme, the way it can deal with objections does inºuence what direc-
tions it develops into in the future.
Given how close Popper and Lakatos were intellectually in the mid-
1960s, it is unlikely that these ideas would not have had an inºuence on
Popper, especially given his claim about Lakatos: “I can say what I think
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7. Lakatos 1970, 1974. Lakatos makes this especially clear in a letter to Yehuda Elkana
in 1973: Lakatos to Yehuda Elkana, March 29, 1973. Lakatos archive, ªle number 13/250.
about him in ªve words: He has revolutionized my thinking.”8 And
Lakatos clearly thought that his ideas had inºuenced Popper: he wrote re-
peatedly (at least a dozen times) on the margins of various manuscripts by
Popper that, “you are stealing from me.”9 It is also likely that Lakatos’s
perception that Popper did not acknowledge his inºuence was the main
cause of the serious fallout between the two philosophers in the early sev-
enties.10
But Lakatos was not the only philosopher in Popper’s circle in the
1960s who argued that the formation of conjectures is not to be compared
to “purely accidental independent mutations.” Others included Elie Zahar
and John Worrall. Zahar argued that even the boldest conjectures could be
given a logical analysis in gradualistic terms (see especially Zahar 1984),
and Worrall (much later) gave a detailed case study of Fresnel’s theory of
diffraction, which shows that his conjectures were not at all random
(Worrall 1995, pp. 92ff; see also Akeroyd 2004, pp. 390–393 for an alter-
native analysis).
To sum up, it seems that, under the inºuence of all these philosophers,
Popper changed his mind about the completely random character of the for-
mation of scientiªc conjectures some time in the 1960s. And this change
was already reºected in his 1965 Compton lecture, where he writes:
The method of trial and error-elimination does not operate with com-
pletely chance-like or random trials [. . .], even though the trials may
look pretty random. [. . .] For the organism is constantly learning
from its mistakes, that is, it establishes controls which suppress or
eliminate, or at least reduce the frequency of, certain possible trials
(which were perhaps actual ones in its evolutionary past). (Popper
[1965] 1972, p. 245, n. 55)11
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8. Popper to Isaiah Berlin on 1964, Febr. 16, Lakatos Archive 13/736/65. Note that
Popper often said that Lakatos has revolutionized the philosophy of mathematics (Lakatos
confronts Popper with this in a letter in 1969, Lakatos archive, ªle number 13/736). But
what he wrote to Berlin is something much stronger: that Lakatos revolutionized his
thinking (not a sub-discipline).
9. Lakatos archive, ªle number 10/2, Lakatos archive, ªle number 15/90.
10. This fallout is well-documented (Lakatos archive, ªle number 13/736, Popper ar-
chive ªle number 318.4–10). Given the intellectual and personal closeness of the two phi-
losophers, this turn of events is even more surprising—and the nominal reasons given
(Lakatos used Popper’s typist without Popper’s authorization, Lakatos failed to give back
the proofs of one of Popper’s articles) clearly do not explain it.
11. Note that when John Worrall criticizes Popper for taking scientiªc conjectures to
be completely random (Worrall 1995), he seems to apply this criticism to Popper’s oeuvre
in general, ignoring this famous footnote.
Popper spent a lot of time in the next decade trying to spell out in what
sense the formation of conjectures is random and in what sense it is not
(some examples: Popper 1974b, p. 1061; 1978, p. 348; 1974a, p. 138;
[1975] 1996, p. 3).
But if he no longer took the formation of scientiªc conjectures to be
completely random, then how could he hold on to the Darwinian analogy?
There are two options: ªrst, he could limit the generality of the analogy
and allow for the differences between mutations and conjectures while
preserving the general structure of the analogy. And, second, he could re-
vise the way of interpreting mutations in such a way that the analogy be-
tween conjectures and mutations is restored. Popper seems to have tried
both of these strategies.
He made a number of attempts to clarify how the “more or less ran-
dom” character of mutations is different from the “more or less random”
character of conjectures. According to the most detailed such attempt, in
his 1973 Herbert Spencer Lecture (Popper [1975] 1996, p. 5), mutations
are (more or less) random and also blind, whereas conjectures are although
still (more or less) random, they are not blind. This way of drawing the
distinction seems to contradict his “Replies to my critics” (written in the
same year as the Spencer lecture), where he describes scientiªc conjectures
as blind and even elaborates on what this means and how it does not ex-
clude goal-directedness (1974b, p. 1061). All of these distinctions and al-
leged clariªcations, regardless of how problematic, ad hoc, or contradictory
they may be, are only supposed to be supplementary to Popper’s more fun-
damental reinterpretation of the Darwinian analogy. Popper recognized
that the formation of scientiªc conjectures is not completely random and
his insistence on the Darwinian analogy forced him to say the same about
mutations. He did try to point out some important differences between
the two processes, but these are supposed to be differences between two
not completely random processes.
But then Popper had to reinterpret the theory of natural selection in
such a way that mutations would come out as not completely random.
And this required some adventures, not always very fortunate ones, into
the domain of biology.
IV. Popper’s Adventures into the Domain of Biology
In the 1960s, Popper was apparently quite preoccupied with various ques-
tions in evolutionary biology. In 1963, he asks Campbell for all of his pa-
pers on evolutionary epistemology.12 In 1965, Lakatos says in a letter to
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Marjorie Grene, somewhat despairingly, that “nowadays, [Popper’s] main
interest is evolution.”13
The focus of Popper’s interest was the question about how random mu-
tations can explain the apparent teleology of the natural world. This
theme appeared in his 1961 lecture:
[The difªculty evolutionary theory faces is] the difªculty of under-
standing how a complicated organ, such as the eye, can ever result
from the purely accidental co-operation of independent mutations.
(p. 273)
And, even more explicitly:
The real difªculty of Darwinism is the well-known problem of ex-
plaining evolutions which are apparently goal-directed such as that of
our eyes, by an incredibly large number of very small steps; for ac-
cording to Darwinism, each of these steps is the result of a purely
accidental mutation. That all these independent accidental muta-
tions should have had survival value is difªcult to explain.
(pp. 269–270)
Popper tried to give an answer to this question in a number of ways. But it
is important to note that the reason why he was interested in these ques-
tions about evolutionary biology was the need to reinterpret his Darwin-
ian analogy. Two of his most infamous attempts to explain how adaptive
evolution is possible in spite of the randomness of mutations were the
“hopeful behavioural monsters hypothesis” (based on Goldschmidt 1940)
and the “double spearhead hypothesis,” which postulates two different
kinds of genes that are subject to selection in different manner. Both of
these ideas are already present in Popper [1961] 1972 (the latter in the
original 1961 lecture, the former only in the addendum written before the
publication in 1972).
Both of these ideas were (rightly) dismissed by Popper’s contemporar-
ies. So much so that Popper’s close friend, Peter Medawar repeatedly dis-
couraged Popper from publishing both the Spencer lecture and later the
Compton lecture (“Of clouds and clocks” (Popper [1965] 1972), where he
repeated the “double spearhead hypothesis.”14 Ernst Mayr was equally
negative: “To be very frank, I was not too happy with your treatment of
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13. Lakatos to Marjorie Grene, 31 December 1965, Lakatos archive, ªle number 13/
346. Lakatos thanks Grene for sending him her article “Beyond Darwinism,” and he
writes: “I wonder whether you sent a copy to Karl Popper who I am sure would be very in-
terested to read it. Nowadays his main interest is evolution.”
14. Peter Medawar to Popper, 1965, March 29; Peter Medawar to Popper 1966, Au-
gust 16; both in Popper Archive, ªle number 325/26. It is Medawar who Popper refers to
natural selection in the essay you wrote in Objective Knowledge.”15 Pop-
per seems to have abandoned his “behavioural monster” idea, but he did
reiterate the “double spearhead hypothesis” throughout the rest of his life,
even in his 1994 Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem. What this lead to
was a certain amount of bewilderment and mistrust towards Popper’s
ideas on behalf of biologists (see Hull 1999 for a thorough summary, but
see also Settle 1996). As John Worrall summarizes, Popper “interprets ‘se-
lection’ in a way that is, to say the least, rather unorthodox” (1995,
p. 102).
V. Popper and Lamarck
The most important, and often ignored, attempt on Popper’s behalf to re-
store his Darwinian analogy was his insistence on the quasi-Lamarckian
character of both natural selection and the growth of scientiªc knowledge.
It is important to note that he never explicitly confessed to Lamarckism,
but suggested that Darwinian selection processes simulate, or resemble,
Lamarckian evolution. He reiterates this suspiciously many times (Popper
1972, pp. 149, 245, 268, 272; 1973; Popper 1974a, p. 138; 1994, p. 70).
He even writes in a letter to Mayr (who was pushing him on his
Lamarckian leanings) that “I am a more orthodox Darwinist than Darwin
[. . .] who believed in the occasional inheritance of acquired characters.”16
It has been argued that Popper uses the labels of Darwinism and
Lamarckism somewhat misleadingly (Hull 1999, p. 492). Maybe a better
distinction for Popper’s purposes would have been the one between soft
and hard inheritance (see Mayr 1982, p. 687ff ). But Popper’s general idea
is simple: in the case of Lamarckian evolution, the ªrst step in the selec-
tion process (conjecture, replication) is guided by the second step of the
previous cycle (falsiªcation, environmental interaction). In the case of
Darwinian selection, it is not. Let us see what this contrast amounts to and
why Popper turned to Lamarck to begin with.
Let us summarize the problem Popper faces. In the case of the growth
of scientiªc knowledge, it seems that the new trials are inºuenced by the
errors committed previously. Popper is quick to admit this, already in his
Compton lecture:
The method of trial and error-elimination does not operate with com-
pletely chance-like or random trials [. . .], even though the trials may
Perspectives on Science 345
at the beginning of the Addendum to the Spencer lecture, as the expert who tried to dis-
courage him from publishing it and not Mayr, as Hull (1999, p. 490) suggests.
15. Ernst Mayr to Popper 1979, July 31, Popper archive, ªle number 325/1.
16. Popper to Ernst Mayr, 1977, April 18, Popper Archive, ªle number 551/4.
look pretty random. [. . .] For the organism is constantly learning
from its mistakes, that is, it establishes controls which suppress or
eliminate, or at least reduce the frequency of, certain possible trials
(which were perhaps actual ones in its evolutionary past. ([1965]
1972, p. 245, n. 55)
But this is clearly not what is happening in the case of gene-based natural
selection. The way Popper understands gene-based natural selection is
very different. He writes in 1975:
[evolutionary] theory predicts accidental mutations and thus acciden-
tal changes. [. . .] Thus we should expect evolutionary sequences of
the random-walk type. (1974a, p. 138, Popper’s emphasis)
And, even more explicitly:
The survival of a mutation cannot inºuence the further mutations,
not even the frequencies or probabilities of their occurrence.
([1975] 1996, p. 5)
Thus, if we want to maintain the analogy between natural selection and
the growth of scientiªc knowledge, we need to reinterpret gene-based se-
lection. And Popper’s idea is that although mutations are not informed by
the previous cycle of error-elimination (like Popper’s interpretation of La-
marckism would have it), they work as if they were informed by the
previous cycle of error-elimination. Again, the intention is that this pic-
ture is not Lamarckian, it is still Darwinian, but it simulates Lamarckian
evolution.
There are two different attempts to ºirt with the idea of Lamarckian
evolution in Popper’s writings in the 1960s and 1970s. The ªrst one is not
too radical—it is basically a revision of the old idea of the Baldwin effect:
a process whereby an organism changes the environment thereby inºuenc-
ing the selection pressures in the next generation (Baldwin 1902; see also
Belew-Mitchell 1996; Weber-Depew 2003; and Godfrey-Smith 2003 for
discussion). As Popper summarizes:
New pressures, new challenges and new problems may arise as a re-
sult of the structural changes which have arisen from within the or-
ganism. ([1975] 1996, p. 4; see also Popper [1961] 1972, pp. 268,
270; [1965] 1972, p. 245, n. 56)
Although the point could be made that Popper somewhat exaggerated the
importance and frequency of the occurrences of the Baldwin effect, it is at
least not problematic from a biological point of view (see Godfrey-Smith
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2003 for a good summary). And the Baldwin effect does exactly what Pop-
per needed: simulates Lamarckian evolution within the Darwinian frame-
work. But Popper realized soon that his appeal to the Baldwin effect will
not be general enough. And this is when he turned to a more radical ver-
sion of Lamarckism.
In 1967, Popper wrote to Lakatos: “You will be thrilled to hear what I
have to tell you about the connection of our common philosophy and the
great Break-through in Biology.”17 Popper did not elaborate on what this
connection is supposed to be, but from the collection of his clippings at
that time, it seems likely that he was referring to the “central dogma of
molecular biology” literature on transcription from RNA to DNA that
Popper took to question the framework of Weismannian (as opposed to
Lamarckian) evolution.18 Popper was interpreting this literature to show
that the ºow of information is not unidirectional from the DNA to the
RNA, which he presumably interpreted as going against the Weisman-
nian orthodoxy that the germ-line is never inºuenced by whatever hap-
pens to the organism during its life. If this were so, then gene-based selec-
tion would be more similar to the quasi-Lamarckian process of selection in
the domain of scientiªc theories—the analogy between gene-based and
scientiªc selection would be restored.
He used much of this literature in an unpublished manuscript “La-
marckism and DNA” (Popper 1973), which he submitted to Nature and
got rejected. “Lamarckism and DNA” is an attempt to revive “molecular
Lamarckism”: the possibility of the inheritance of acquired characters in
the light of recent contemporary ªndings of molecular biology. Popper is
somewhat cautious: he does not argue that there is a mechanism for the in-
heritance of acquired characters but that we cannot exclude the possibility
of such a mechanism. And Popper is also cautious as his conclusion is not
strictly speaking Lamarckian. He concludes on a somewhat vague note
that “this is not Lamarckism, but would in some respect resemble it”
(1973). After Nature had rejected the manuscript, Popper abandoned it
completely (see Aronova 2007, p. 44); however, he did not abandon the
general idea of reviving something like Lamarckism.
Popper’s enthusiasm for this way of salvaging the Darwinian analogy
reached a new high when he read Edward Steele’s book Somatic Selection and
Adaptive Evolution ([1979] 1981), which is an explicit attempt to revive
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17. Popper to Lakatos, 1967, January 9, Popper archive ªle number 318.4–10, Lakatos
archive, ªle number 13/736.
18. Among his clippings from this period are three Encyclopaedia entries on
Weismann (one from the 1967 Encyclopaedia Britannica) as well as lots of photocopies from
the Lamarckian theoretical framework of selection. Popper was very en-
thusiastic about the book19 and wrote a very positive review in the Times
Literary Supplement, where he describes Steele’s book as “the most exciting
scientiªc book which I had read for a very long time” and, importantly,
concludes that “Steele shows that, in the light of molecular virology, both
Darwin and Lamarck may have been right” (Popper 1979, p. 5). But Pop-
per gets even closer to a straight endorsement of Lamarckism when he
writes to Steele in a letter that “a kind of Lamarckism is compatible with
modern genetic ªndings.”20
Needless to say that this quasi-Lamarckian turn did not go down well
with biologists (again, see Hull 1999 for a summary). To make things
worse, Steele’s book was based on experiments that were very controversial
methodologically even at the time when Popper’s review appeared (see
Aronova 2007, pp. 45–47 for a good overview).
To sum up, we can say that Popper’s revived and modiªed Darwinian
analogy of the 1970s, where gene-based natural selection is modelled on
the analogy of the growth of scientiªc knowledge, was not at all more suc-
cessful than his original analogy where the growth of scientiªc knowledge
was modelled on the analogy of gene-based selection.
Should we conclude that Popper’s entire idea of the analogy between
gene-based natural selection and the growth of scientiªc knowledge was
mistaken? This is the question I brieºy examine in the last section.
VI. Much Ado about Nothing?
Popper’s idea of the analogy between gene-based natural selection and the
growth of scientiªc knowledge has been extremely inºuential. Besides the
evolutionary epistemology movement (see,for example, Campbell 1956,
1960, 1974; Toulmin 1967, 1970, 1972; Kantorovich 1989; Bradie
1986), it has inºuenced much of the meme theory literature (Dawkins
1989, 1982a, 1982b; Dennett 1995; Aunger 2000, 2002) and especially
David Hull’s speciªc version of the selection among scientiªc theories21
(Hull 1988, 2001; cf. Bechtel 1988; Ghiselin 1988; and Griesemer 1988
for a variety of objections to his account) as well as Bas van Fraassen’s Dar-
winian model for an antirealist explanation for the success of science (Van
Fraassen 1980, p. 40).22
But I aimed to point out that Popper held two very different versions of
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the “the central dogma of molecular biology” literature. Popper archive, ªle number 384/
12.
19. Popper to Edward Steele, 1979, February 9, Popper Archive, ªle number 352/17.
20. Popper to Edward Steele, 1979, October 12, Popper archive, ªle number 352/17.
21. Popper’s inºuence on Hull is not difªcult to trace: as we have seen, he took Popper’s
the Darwinian analogy at different points of his life and both of them are
extremely problematic: one of them as a description of the growth of
scientiªc knowledge and the other as a biological theory. Was Popper then
completely wrong about the Darwinian analogy in general? And were the
ones who followed Popper’s lead and endorsed a version of this analogy
also completely wrong? I do not want to endorse the Darwinian analogy,
nor do I want to rule it out as hopeless. What I aim to do in this section is
to give a more viable and plausible version of it than the ones I have
identiªed in Popper’s thinking.
My claim is that gene-based natural selection in fact works in a very
similar way as Lakatos conceives of the growth of scientiªc knowledge: as
a process whereby changes in the previous generation inºuence the next
round of mutation. In fact, David Hull’s widely (but not universally, see
footnote 4 above) accepted deªnition of selection reºects this requirement:
The repeated cycles of replication and environmental interaction so
structured that environmental interaction causes replication to be differen-
tial. (Hull et al. 2001, p. 53, my emphasis)
Take the following, very simpliªed, example. Suppose that an organism, a,
is 12 feet tall. It has three offspring, b, c, and d, which are 10, 12, and 14
feet tall, respectively. The selection pressure is such that short individuals
are selected against: b and c dies, and d survives. Now, and this is the cru-
cial point, the offspring of the surviving d will tend to have the average
height of 14 feet. Suppose that d also has three offspring: e, f, and g, which
are 12, 14, and 16 feet tall, respectively. Again, if short organisms are se-
lected against, then g will survive and its offspring are going to be even
taller. Here evolution has what Popper would call “a direction” (Popper
1974a, p. 138), but we can explain that without any appeal to either
Lamarckian or quasi-Lamarckian processes or the “double spearhead
hypothesis.”
So where did Popper go wrong? He described gene-based natural selec-
tion as “purely accidental co-operation of independent mutations” ([1961]
1972, p. 273) and then spent a lot of time trying to specify in what sense
mutations are “accidental” or “random.” But the problem is not with the
claim that mutations are accidental but with the claim that they are inde-
pendent. A mutation in my mother’s genes will inºuence the outcome of
the mutations of my genes inasmuch as my genes that get mutated are the
result of the mutation of my mother’s genes. In this sense, mutations are
not independent at all.
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class at Indiana University in 1963 and Popper wrote a (very positive) letter of recommen-
dation for him in 1964.
Or, to use another one of Popper’s explicit statements, he says that in
the case of gene-based natural selection, “the survival of a mutation cannot
inºuence the further mutations, not even the frequencies or probabilities
of their occurrence” ([1975] 1996, p. 5). This is false, for the reasons just
given. It is true that the survival of a mutation does not inºuence to what
direction or with what probability a further mutation happens. But it does
inºuence what will mutate: it inºuences what will serve as the basis for
this mutation.
Can we then restore Popper’s Darwinian analogy in a non-Popperian
manner? I want to be careful here. If we accept that the growth of
scientiªc knowledge works the way Lakatos describes it (and the way Pop-
per describes it in his Compton lecture, esp. Popper [1965] 1972, p. 245,
n. 55), then there is an analogy between gene-based natural selection and
the growth of scientiªc knowledge: in both cases the entities that survive
error-elimination are the ones that provide the starting point for the next
round of trials, and in that sense the survival of a mutation does inºuence
further mutations. Selection is cumulative in both cases.23
But it is a different, and much more complicated, question whether
this analogy or, rather, this similarity in a speciªc respect, is explanatory.
Stephen Toulmin, another early proponent of the Darwinian analogy, re-
peatedly argued that this analogy is explanatory (see esp. Toulmin 1967;
see also Toulmin 1970, pp. 560–566 and Toulmin 1972, but see Lakatos’s
demolition of Toulmin’s argument in Lakatos 1976). Popper also took the
analogy to be explanatory: he thought that we gain some genuine insight
into the way scientiªc knowledge grows if we take the Darwinian analogy
seriously. My aim here is not to argue that the Darwinian analogy is in fact
explanatory. I am making a much more modest, conditional, claim: if one
intends to use the Darwinian analogy to explain the growth of scientiªc
knowledge, the version of the analogy I sketched in this section is a better
bet than the two (very different) versions that Popper considered.24
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22. Van Fraassen explicitly acknowledges the inºuence of Popper’s “The rationality of
scientiªc revolutions” paper I discussed above, especially its sections I–VI and VIII. Per-
sonal communication with Van Fraassen, August 26, 2006.
23. This may explain why Popper overlooked this simple way of salvaging the Darwin-
ian analogy and looked for much more complicated and more problematic solutions. Pop-
per often contrasted “cumulative” and “revolutionary” as attributes of scientiªc change (see
for example, Popper [1975] 1996, p. 12) and he took scientiªc change to be the latter. It is
important that Popper’s contrast between “cumulative” and “revolutionary” is similar to
his contrast between instruction and selection. Hence, it would have been possible for him
to allow for the possibility of a selection process that is cumulative in the sense that every
small step in this process would consist of trial and error-elimination, but these steps fol-
low each other in a cumulative manner—which is exactly the way biologists describe the
process of natural selection.
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